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LEGISLATION
LEGISLATION-A PROPOSED DANGEROIJS DRIVING
STATUTE FOR KENTUCKYIt is common knowledge that deaths and nijuries resulting
from improper operation of vehicles upon the highways have
reached, in the past few years, alarming and tragic proportions. It is therefore necessary that increased attention be
given to improving existing motor vehicle laws.
That this need is recogmzed, is evidenced by the report
from the President's Highway Safety Conference1 and by statutes in at least forty states.2 The former contains the reckless
driving statute proposed by the Uniform Vehicle Code and the
latter have created offenses of reckless driving though, the
language employed is often not accurately descriptive of recklessness.
The Uniform. Vehicle Code provides that, "any person who
drives any vehicle in wllful or wanton disregard for the safety
of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving." It is to
be noted that this definition includes, as do the state statutes, a
reference to property This is uncalled for because human
safety and property are not equally deserving of protection and
should not be placed on an equal footing. The primary purpose in having dangerous driving statutes should be to insure
the safety of the public. Mention of property accompanied by
the idea of safety of persons would seem to detract from, or to
obscure, the importance of the latter. Furthermore, recovery
of damages for the destruction of property is an adequate
remedy and sufficient safeguard therefor, while this is probably not true in cases of personal injury and certainly not true
* Governor Willis has appointed a State Co-ordinating Committee on Highway Safety This note and one on drunken driving, also
appearing in this issue of the Kentucky Law Journal, page 90, were
prepared in cooperation with the Sub-Committee of Laws and Ordinances of which Emmet V Mittlebeeler, Assistant Attorney General,
is chairman. Each note suggests a Model Statute to the Governor's
Committee.
1
REPORT OF COMMITTEE Ox LAwS AND ORDINANCES (1946)
(This report is of the President's Highway Safety Conference).
Ibid.
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n case of death. While it might be argued that the offenses of
assault and battery, manslaughter, and murder are sufficient
deterrents against dangerous driving, such an argument ignores
reality People seldom imagine themselves injuring or killing
anyone and therefore do not foresee prosecution for assault and
battery, manslaughter or murder. But, if there is a dangerous
driving statute, those operating vehicles may be constantly aware
of possible violation of such a statute and of the consequent
penalization therefor.
Another observation may be made of th.e reckless driving
statute contained an the uniform code. The definition of the
proposed offense as generat in nature rather than specific or
enumerative. Tins is as it should be. To enumerate is to mark
the limits of and to confine the operations of a statute. A case
unanticipated by the framers of a dangerous driving statute,
though involving highly dangerous conduct nnght fall without
its enumerative scope.
This enumerative type of statute is found within the motor
vehicle laws of a few states.3 However, reckless driving is
defined in general terms and then certain prohibited acts are
set out, the doing of which as declared to constitute reckless
driving. Typical of this enumerative type of statute is that of
Virginia which specifies eight acts which constitute reckless
driving, e. g., failure to stop upon approaching a school bus
where children are getting on or off.4 Though such a statute may
have its merits, it is believed for reasons stated previously in
tis note, that an offense of dangerous driving should be defined
in general terms. Tis has evidently been recogmzed for the
great majority of the statutes are worded generally 5
The most serious objection to the Uniform Code provision
and to most state statutes on reckless driving is based upon the
use of the words "wilful or wanton.'"' These words are em'PENN. STATUTES (Purdon, Compact ed. 1936) Tit. 75, sec. 481,
VA. CODE (1942) sec. 2154 (108).
4VA. CODE (1942) sec. 2154 (108)
'ALA. CODE (1940) Tit. 36, sec. 3; DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF
Aric. (Pope, 1937) sec. 6708; CAL. CODE (Deeing, 1935) Vehicles,

sec. 505; 2 COLO. STATUTES ANN.

(1935)

Chap. 16, sec. 188; IowA

CODE (1939) sec. 5022.04; MicH. COMPILED LAWS (1929) 4694, subsec.
(4), OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1945) sec. 6307-20.
GDIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARK. (Pope, 1937) sec. 6708; CAL.
CODE (Deering, 1935) vehicles, sec. 505; 2 COLO. STATUTES ANN.
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ployed as equivalents of "reckless" when 'n fact they mean
something more. According to dictionary definitions the words
are not at all synonomous and apparently rank in the order of
reckless, wanton, and willful, from the least to the greatest
degree of departure from the standard of desirable conduct
(or desirable mental state) Thus, reckless may mean "utterly
heedless", wanton, "arrogant recklessness", and willful may
be termed "intentional.' '7 A typical statute purporting to
create the offense of reckless driving by this inexact use of
words is that of Califorma which states that, "
Any person
who drives any vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reck)18
less driving
This statute apparently was drawn in ignorance of the
distinction between what constitutes reckless conduct and what
constitutes wanton or willful conduct. Criminal negligence may
be categorized according to the degree of negligence involved
in particular offenses. 9 Thus, in negligent manslaughter the
word "reckless" should be employed in describing the negligence requisite for that offense, 1 while the word "wanton" is
appropriate in the case of the negligent murder. 1 Words,
then, should be chosen carefully in drafting a statute because
words actually have their peculiar functions in describing separate and particular realities.
Other statutes are more accurately worded. Of these,
typical language employed to describe reckless driving is"
without due regard
so as to endanger
.,
,
reck(1935) Chap. 16, sec. 188; ILL. REV. STATUTES (1945) Chap. 95 , sec.
145; IOWA CODE (1939) sec. 5022.04.
'WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1945)
Reckless: 1. "That does not reck of one's duty, character, life, or the
like; now usually careless; neglectful; indifferent; inconsiderate; as,

utterly reckless of danger. 2. Characterized by or manifesting lack
of due caution; rash; utterly heedless; as, reckless youth, adventures,
buying or driving." Wanton "Marked by or manifesting arrogant
recklessness of justice, of the rights or feelings of others, or the

like; brutally insolent; merciless; inhumane;
ling; disposed or ready; also, wishful; desirous.

" Willfull 1. 'Wil2. Self determined;

voluntary; intentional; as, willful murder."
3
CAL. CODE (Deering, 1935) Vehicle, sec. 505.
9
MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

° MORELAND, Op. cit. supra, note 9 at 64.
'MORELAND, op. cit. supra, note 9 at 68.
" OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page. 1945) sec. 6407-20.

(1944) 62.
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in a.
in a manner so as to endanger
lessly, or
manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper
use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of

the public highway

",14

It would seem that these statutes describe reckless driving.
more accurately than those which use the words wanton or -willful. The latter, if construed according to their ordinary meaning should be held to describe conduct of a more serious nature
than that of recklessness. Driving which involves a high degree
of danger may be reckless and that which involves an extremely
high degree of danger may be wanton. Though all wanton
driving should warrant conviction under a recldess driving statute, the converse is not true. The greater offense includes the
lesser but the lesser does not include the greater offense. Certainly there are degrees of dangerous conduct and this should
be borne in mind in drafting a dangerous driving statute. It
is a miscarriage of justice to convict one of reckless driving
under circiumstances indicating wantonness, or to convict of
wanton driving under a state of facts revealing only recklessness.
Therefore, a dangerous driving statute should be carefully
worded so as to create both offenses.
To so embody two offenses in a dangerous driving statute
would not be unusual, for courts have interpreted statutes as
doing just that. In Barkley v ,State,15 the court interpreted
the statute as creating two offenses, that of willful or wanton
driving, and that of driving so as to endanger persons or property For the first offense the court was of the opinion that
something more than ordinary negligence was required, but the
tort standard of care was deemed appropriate for the second
offense. In Neessen v Armstrong,'0 the court in considering
a reckless driving statute similar to that before the court in
Barkley v State, also reached the conclusion that two offenses
had been created. It interpreted the phrase "without due caultion and circumspection" as referring to szmple negligence and
not something more such as recklessness. It would seem then,
that using the words willful or wanton, or without due caution
'VA. CODE (1942) sec. 2154 (108)
142 LAWS OF N.Y.
(Thompson, 1939) VEH. & TRAPF. LAW sec. 58.
165 Tenn. 309, 54 S.W 2d 944 (1932).

0213 Iowa 378, 239 N.W 56 (1931).
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and circumspection, within the same statute 17 creates two offenses.
However, due care has the connotation of the tort standard
of negligence and should not be included in a dangerous driving
statute as the basis for one of the offenses. The reason is that
conduct which ordinarily calls only for civil liability is being
transposed by statute into criminal conduct. Even were this
proper, to create such an offense along with the offense of wanton driving is not reasonable. They are poles apart in degrees of
danger to the public and leave between them a wide gulf wherein criminal conduct may be committed without actually constituting either offense. Thus for recklessness which involves a
high degree of danger it would be unjust to punish offenders
for wanton conduct since the latter involves an extremely high
degree of danger. Neither would it be just to punish such reckless offenders for conduct involving a degree of danger characteristic of civil negligence. Though it is logical, therefore, to
create two offenses in a dangerous driving statute, conduct on
the civil negligence level should not be one of them. Rather,
the offenses should be those higher in degrees of danger, reckless driving and wanton driving.
Kentucky statutes relative to improper driving go little
beyond ordinary traffic regulations. Particular acts in operating vehicles deemed undesirable, are covered by various and
separate statutes. Thus driving at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent is prohibited by one statute ;Is another
declares that on approaching a curve or obstruction the driver
shall have the vehicle under control ;iO vehicles are to be driven
on the right side of the road;20 and operating a vehicle while
intoxicated is prohibited.2 1 It is, of course, impossible to have
a statute for every situation that may arise without wording
a statute in such general terms that any situation or combination
of situations might fall within it. An individual under the
present Kentucky statutes might commit highly dangerous
CODE (1940) Tit. 36, sec. 3; 1 MICH. COMPMhED LAWS
sec. 4696, subsec. (4) N.C. GEN. ST. (1943) sec. 20-140
sec. 189.390 (1)
"'Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 189.410.
"KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 189.300.
" Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 189.520.
"ALA.

(1929)

SKy. R. S. (1946)
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conduct in operating a vehicle and receive, at most, only a light
penalty 22 The only Kentucky statute which in general terms
prohibits improper driving without particularizing is one on
careful driving. It provides. "The operator of any vehicle upon a highway shall operate the vehicle in a careful manner,
with regard for the safety and convenience of pedestrians and
other vehicles upon the highway ",23 This statute is wholly
inappropriate for it would apply to conduct of the civil negligence level though negligence of a criminal nature were not involved. It seems unfortunate that a statute should be so drawn
as to speak in tort standard terms when what is sought to be

prevented is driving involving high degrees of danger and of a
criminal nature.

With, the foregoing considerations in mind, the writer proposes the following statute on dangerous driving
DANGEROUS DRIVING PROHIBITED.
(1)

Reckless driving.
(a) Any person who drives a vehicle upon a highway of this
state under such circumstances, and in such a manner as to
create a high degree of danger to human life, which he
should realize, as a reasonable man, constitutes a reckless
disregard of the safety of others, is guilty of reckless driving; and,
(b) Upon conviction thereof shall be punished by fine of not
less than twenty (20) dollars nor more than one hundred
(100) dollars or imprisonment for not less than ten (10)
days nor more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine
and imprisonment and suspension of license for ninety (90)
days; and, upon a subsequent conviction the maximum fine
or the maximum imprisonment herein provided for, or both,
shall be inflicted upon such person and his license shall be
revoked for such a period as is deemed proper by the court.

(2)

Wanton driving.
(a) Any person who drives a vehicle upon a highway of this
state under such circumstances, and in such a manner as to
create an extremely high degree of danger to human life,
which he should realize, as a reasonable man, constitutes
a wanton disregard of the safety of others, is guilty of wanton driving; and,
(b) Upon conviction thereof shall be punished by fine of not
less than fifty (50) dollars nor more than one hundred
fifty (150) dollars or by imprisonment for not less than
fifteen (15) days nor more than forty (40) days or by both
such fine and imprisonment and suspension of license for
2KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 189.990.
2Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 189.290.
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six (6) months; and, upon a subsequent conviction either
the maximum fine or maximum imprisonment herein provided for, or both, shall be inflicted upon such person, and
his license shall be revoked for such a period as is deemed
proper by the court.

This proposed statute has resulted from an examination of
the statutes of other states on reckless driving, and it is believed,
has important advantages over many of them. It avoids a
limitation of its application to specified acts which is probably
characteristic of the enumerative type of statute. In order to
find one guilty of dangerous driving, all of the circumstances
such, as rate of speed, width of the road, traffic and use of the
road, intersections, weather conditions, weight of the vehicle
24
and probability of endangering others, should be considered.
This is made possible in the proposed statute by the use of the
words, "under such circumstances."
It is the circumstances
under which a traffic violation occurs, not the violation alone,
that will determine whether reckless or wanton driving has
occurred. One may drive at a high rate of speed contrary to
law and not be guilty of reckless driving under the circumstances, 25 or he may observe the speed limit and yet be guilty of
26
recklessness under the eircumstances.
Another important characteristic of the proposed statute
is that the words are chosen carefully in recognition of the fact
that particular words may be peculiarly adapted to describe
different grades of negligence. The word "willful" is omitted
because it means intentional. If an automobile is driven with
the intention of endangering persons, a crime of attempt could
be made out and criminal penalties therefor should provide
adequate remedy in the way of deterrence. Words that might
lay down a tort standard of conduct are omitted in the belief
that instances of ordinary negligence will be covered by ordinary
traffic regulations and that such conduct does not constitute a
serious, certainly not a criminal, threat to public safety That
which is to be deterred is dangerous conduct which, were it to
result in injury would call for conviction of assault and battery,
'State v Dill, 34 Del. (W W Harr.) 320, 152 Atl. 424 (1930).
'People v Carrie, 204 N. Y. Supp. 759, 122 Misc. Rep. 753
(1924)
" State v. Mickle, 194 N. C. 808, 140 S. E. 150 (1927).
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and if death resulted would call for conviction of manslaughter
or murder.
Finally, a word should be said as to what constitutes appropriate penalties. Not much can be concluded from the statutes on reckless driving except that they vary m the penalties
they prescribe. The Pennsylvama statute provides for a very
light penalty for reckless driving-a fine of not less than ten
dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars and costs of prosecution, and, in default of payment, imprisonment for not more
than ten days. 27 At the other extreme are statutes2 s of which
the Colorado statute is roughly typical. It provides for a fine of
not more than five hundred dollars or imprisonment for not
more than ninety days or for both such fine and imprisonment.
For a second or subsequent conviction a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both such fine and imprisonment, may be inposed
plus a revocation of the offender's license. 29 Other statutes"0
fall somewhere between these extremes, as does the statute
herein proposed. The latter, logically, prescribes higher punishment for the offense of wanton driving than it does for the
offense of reckless driving. This is as it should be for the "punishment should fit the crime," and wanton driving is the more
serious of the two offenses. Too, for subsequent convictions the
greater punishment may be imposed. This is logical for the
reason that it requires more severe treatment to deter the type
of individual who will repeat a crime. It is proper of course
to emphasize the fact that penalties should be reasonable, otherwise the law is not likely to be enforced. Those proposed are
believed to be satisfactory in this respect.
In conclusion, the writer submits that a dangerous driving
statute similar to the one proposed should be enacted in Kentucky and that it would make a worthwhile contribution to the
safety of the public.
ARNETT IAN
-" PA. STATUTES (Purdon, Compact ed. 1936) Tit. 75, sec. 481.
"-ALA. CODE (1940) Tit. 36, sec. 3; DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF
ARK. (Pope, 1937) sec. 6708; N. C. GEN. ST. (1943) Motor Vehicles,
sec. 20-140.
2'2 COLO. STATUTES ANN. (1935) Chap. 16, sec. 188.
' CAL. CODE (Deering, 1935) Vehicle sec. 505; IOWA CODE (1939)
sec. 5022.05.

